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Data Privacy for a ρ-Recoverable Function
Ajaykrishnan Nageswaran and Prakash Narayan†
Abstract
A user’s data is represented by a finite-valued random variable. Given a function of the data, a querier is required
to recover, with at least a prescribed probability, the value of the function based on a query response provided by
the user. The user devises the query response, subject to the recoverability requirement, so as to maximize privacy
of the data from the querier. Privacy is measured by the probability of error incurred by the querier in estimating
the data from the query response. We analyze single and multiple independent query responses, with each response
satisfying the recoverability requirement, that provide maximum privacy to the user. In the former setting, we also
consider privacy for a predicate of the user’s data. Achievability schemes with explicit randomization mechanisms
for query responses are given and their privacy compared with converse upper bounds.
Keywords−Chernoff radius, function computation, predicate privacy, privacy, recoverability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a (legitimate) user’s data that is represented by a finite-valued random variable (rv) with known
probability mass function (pmf). A querier wishes to compute a given function of the data from a user-provided
query response which is a suitably randomized version of the data. The user devises the query response so as
to enable the querier to recover from it the function value with a prescribed accuracy while maximizing privacy
of the data, i.e., minimizing the likelihood of the querier learning the data value from it. A generalization entails
the user devising multiple independent such query responses with each query response adhering to the prescribed
recoverability requirement, while maximizing overall privacy.
We consider a new and rudimentary formulation of this setting in which the user forms a query response from
which the querier can recover the function value with probability at least ρ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Under this requirement, the
chosen query response must afford maximum data privacy. Specifically, the query response must inflict – on the
querier’s best estimate from it of the data value – a maximum probability of error. Beginning with a single query
response, we give an explicit characterization of a randomization mechanism that enables ρ-recoverability of the
function value and yields the corresponding maximum privacy, termed ρ-privacy. In particular, our query-response
scheme is tantamount to an “add-noise” mechanism with the user computing first the function value and then
adding to it a suitable value-dependent noise. Our optimal single query response depends on the pmf of the data
rv only in a limited way through associated minentropies. Furthermore, when privacy is sought for a predicate of
the user data, we obtain a characterization of predicate ρ-privacy and an explicit randomization mechanism that
attains it. Next, when the querier elicits n ≥ 1 ρ-recoverable and independent query responses, privacy of user
data can degrade while accuracy of function estimation by the querier improves. We provide a converse upper
bound for maximum privacy with respect to such responses, i.e., ρ-privacy, for every n. When 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1,
this upper bound decays exponentially in n to a limit which is the querier’s data-estimation error on the basis
of a knowledge of the exact function value (i.e., corresponding to ρ = 1). The rate of this decay is shown to
be (the Kullback-Leibler divergence) D (Ber(0.5)||Ber(ρ)). We provide an explicit add-noise achievability scheme
with privacy that converges to the mentioned limit at the same exponential rate. When 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, we again
provide an explicit add-noise achievability scheme. While it remains unknown whether the corresponding privacy is
optimal, this scheme is shown to prevent the querier from estimating exactly the function value for any n. Neither
achievability scheme depends on a knowledge of the pmf of the data rv. Finally, these two achievability schemes are
shown to be asymptotically superior in privacy to a scheme made up of (conditionally) independent and identically
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2distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of our optimal single query response; this is done by means of suitable asymptotic
approximations of privacy in terms of Chernoff radii. The superiority of the former schemes is enabled by rendering
an estimation by the querier of the exact function value to be more error-prone than by the latter scheme, while
conforming to the ρ-recoverability requirement.
An explanation of our approach is in order. In a model for private function computation, the querier can possess
initial knowledge or beliefs of the user’s data in the form of a family of prior pmfs that describe said data.
Accordingly, the user must fashion a query response or responses that assure data privacy in the form of an
adequate querier’s probability of data-estimation error for every prior in said family. As indicated in Section VI,
the minmax of the probability of data-estimation error (maximum and minimum, respectively, over query responses
and prior pmfs) serves as a minimum guarantee of privacy for user data. In this approach, our concept of ρ-privacy
developed below plays a basal role whose operational significance is clear also if the querier’s uncertainty regarding
the user’s data were reflected by a (single) known pmf or if the user’s data were known to be generated by said
pmf. It should be added that the maximum probability of error criterion is eminently tractable – as our work shows
– compared with more discerning measures, e.g., L1- or L2-distances between user data and the querier’s estimate
of it. The latter measures serve to penalize deviation of the querier’s estimate of user data from its true value, a
discriminating feature missing in our work (and one which is currently under study).
Our approach is in the spirit of prior works that deal with information leakage of a user’s private data with
associated nonprivate correlated data. A randomized version of the nonprivate data is released publicly under a
constraint on the expected distortion between the nonprivate and public data. For instance, in [29], [7], [27],
leakage as measured by the mutual information between the private and public data is minimized with respect to
the “channel” from the former to the latter, while constraining a distortion between the nonprivate and public data.
In a more elaborate setting [31], temporally i.i.d. private and nonprivate data that are correlated across multiple
users are encoded into a bin index. With this index and additional side-information as inputs, a decoder reconstructs
the nonprivate data under a distortion constraint. Privacy is gauged by the conditional entropy rate of the private
data given the decoder’s inputs, and achievable privacy-distortion pairs are characterized. These works are based on
principles of rate distortion theory. A variant model in [26] considers private and public data as the input and output
of a channel with a “hard” distortion requirement between them being met with probability 1. Based on a concept
of “maximal leakage” introduced in [20], privacy-recoverability tradeoffs are characterized with privacy measured
in terms of α-Re´nyi divergence. In a separate vein, in [19] a possibly randomized function of the private and
nonprivate data is released publicly while constraining the expected distortion between the nonprivate and public
data. Measuring privacy in terms of a minimal expected loss function of private data and its estimate based on
public data, optimal privacy mechanisms are “learned” in binary and Gaussian settings using techniques based on
generative adversarial nets [17]. By comparison, for finite-valued data and query responses, upon limiting ourselves
to information leakage as a probability of error and recoverability as a (pointwise) conditional probability of error,
we obtain exact and approximate utility-privacy tradeoffs for single and multiple query responses, respectively. This
is in contrast to a prior approach [2] in which maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of private and nonprivate
data are formed on basis of a randomized version of the latter which is made public. The private, nonprivate and
public data are assumed to form a Markov chain. Under a constraint on the probability of estimating correctly
the private data, mechanisms are sought for said randomization so as to maximize correct MAP estimation of the
nonprivate data.
An important movement that has received dominant attention in recent years is differential privacy, introduced
in [11], [12] and explored further in [28], [6], [3], [24], among others. Consider a database that hosts multiple
users’ data that, in our framework, constitutes a data vector. The notion of differential privacy stipulates that altering
a data vector slightly leads only to a near-imperceptible change in the corresponding probability distribution of
the output of the privacy mechanism, i.e., query responses that are randomized functions of data vectors. We note
that unlike in differential privacy, our work lacks a notion of closeness of datasets. Upon imposing a differential
privacy constraint, there exists a large body of work that seeks to maximize function recoverability by minimizing
a discrepancy cost between function value and randomized query response; a sampling is mentioned below. In
contrast, our work maximizes privacy under a constraint on recoverability, and may be viewed as a companion
approach. Considering a class of linear functions of data, tradeoffs between recoverability as measured by the worst-
case L2-distance (over user data) between function value and query response, and differential privacy, are examined
in [18]. Similar tradeoffs for add-noise differential private mechanisms with an additional restriction are characterized
3in [16]. Other pertinent works include parameter estimation [32], empirical-frequency-of-data estimation [4] and
distribution estimation [10], [21], [36], all under differential privacy constraints. A relaxation of the concept of
differential privacy is examined in [3] in the form of distributional differential privacy as part of a larger framework
of “coupled-worlds privacy.” Distributional differential privacy requires the mentioned indistinguishability to hold
for a random data vector over probability distributions in a specified family (to which our allusion above to the
querier’s initial knowledge of a family of prior pmfs for the user’s data is redolent). This is in contrast to a worst-case
requirement over the family of all probability distributions of the data vector in a differential privacy context.
Directions other than differential privacy have also been pursued. As mentioned in [35], these include studies based
on clustering (e.g., [34]), t-closeness (e.g., [25]), data pertubation (e.g., [14]), etc; see [35] for a comprehensive list.
Other methods include (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy (e.g., [15]), confidence intervals (e.g., [1]), and cryptographic approaches
(e.g., [5]).
Our model for ρ-recoverable function computation with associated privacy is described in Section II. The ρ-
privacy and predicate ρ-privacy for a single query response are characterized in Section III, and ρ-privacy is
extended to multiple independent query responses in Section IV. The inadequacy of (conditionally) i.i.d. repetitions
of the optimum ρ-privacy scheme of Section III in the context of Section IV is brought out in Section V. The
concluding Section VI mentions unanswered questions even in our simple setting of multiple independent query
responses.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A (legitimate) user’s data is represented by a rv X taking values in a finite set X with |X |= r, say, and of known
pmf PX with PX (x) > 0, x ∈ X . Throughout, we shall consider a given mapping f : X → Z = {0, 1, . . . , k−1},
2 ≤ k ≤ r. For a realization X = x in X , a querier – who does not know x – wishes to compute f (x) from a
query response (QR) F (x) provided by the user, where F (x) is a rv with values in Z. A QR must satisfy the
following recoverability condition.
Definition 1. Given 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, a QR F (X) is ρ-recoverable if
P (F (X) = f (x) |X = x) ≥ ρ, x ∈ X . (1)
Condition (1) can be written equivalently in terms of a stochastic matrix W : X → Z with the requirement
W (f (x) |x) ≥ ρ, x ∈ X ; (2)
which, too, will constitute a ρ-recoverable QR. Such a ρ-recoverable F (X) or W will be termed ρ-QR. Note that
ρ-recoverability in (1), (2) does not depend on PX .
Definition 2. A ρ-QR F (X) will be called an add-noise ρ-QR if it can be expressed as
F (X) = f(X) +N mod k (3)
where N is a Z-valued rv that satisfies
N −◦− f(X) −◦− X (4)
and with conditional pmf given by
P (N = i|X = x) = P (N = i|f(X) = f(x),X = x)
= P (N = i|f(X) = f(x)) (5)
= V (i+ f(x) mod k |f(x)) (6)
for some stochastic matrix V : Z → Z with V (i|i) ≥ ρ, i ∈ Z; we shall refer to it also as add-noise ρ-QR V .
Thus, an add-noise ρ-QR is obtained by adding to the function value f(x) a noise N whose (conditional) pmf can
depend on f(x).
By (3)-(6), an add-noise ρ-QR F (X) with V : Z → Z has the following property:
P (F (X) = i|f(X) = f(x),X = x) = V (i|f(x)) , i ∈ Z, x ∈ X . (7)
4Definition 3. Denoting by Z the rv F (X) with values in Z, the privacy of a ρ-QR F (X) (or equivalently ρ-QR
W ) satisfying (1) (respectively (2)) is
piρ (F ) = piρ (W ) = min
g
P (g (Z) 6= X) (8)
where the minimum is over all estimators g : Z → X of X on the basis of F (X). Clearly, the minimum in (8) is
attained by the MAP estimator gMAP = gMAP (W ) : Z → X given by
gMAP (W )(i) = arg max
x∈X
PX (x)W (i|x) , i ∈ Z (9)
so that (8) equals P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X). When F (X) is an add-noise ρ-QR V as in Definition 2, we shall denote
piρ(F ) in (8) by piρ(V ). The corresponding minimum in (8) will be denoted by P (gMAP (V ) (Z) 6= X) where
gMAP (V )(i) = arg max
x∈X
PX (x)V (i|f(x)), i ∈ Z. (10)
Ties in (9) and (10) are broken arbitrarily.
Remark: We assume throughout that the querier knows PX and W for computing the MAP estimate in (9).
Definition 4. For each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, the maximum privacy that can be attained by a ρ-QR is termed ρ-privacy and
denoted by pi (ρ) , i.e.,
pi (ρ) = max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
piρ (W ) . (11)
Remark: That the maximum in (11) exists will be seen below.
The following simple lemma shows when a ρ-QR W is also an add-noise ρ-QR, and will be helpful in our proofs
of achievability of privacy by ρ-QRs.
Lemma 1. Given 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, for a ρ-QR W : X → Z with identical rows for all x ∈ f−1(i), i ∈ Z , there exists
an add-noise ρ-QR V = V (W ) : Z → Z with the same privacy, i.e., with piρ(V ) = piρ(W ). Conversely, for an
add-noise ρ-QR V : Z → Z , there exists a ρ-QR W = W (V ) : X → Z with identical rows as above, and with
piρ(W ) = piρ(V ).
Proof : For a stochastic matrix W : X → Z which satisfies (2) and has rows {(W (i′|x), i′ ∈ Z) , x ∈ X} that are
identical for all x ∈ f−1(i), i ∈ Z , consider a stochastic matrix V = V (W ) : Z → Z given by
V (i|j) = W (i|x) for every x ∈ f−1(j), i, j ∈ Z (12)
and an associated add-noise QR F ′(X) defined as in (3)-(6) with V as above. Since V (i|i) ≥ ρ, i ∈ Z , in (12),
F ′(X) is an add-noise ρ-QR. To see that piρ(V ) = piρ(W ), we have
P
(
gMAP (V )(F
′ (X) ) = X
)
=
∑
i∈Z
max
x∈X
P (X = x, F ′(X) = i) (13)
where in the right-side,
P (X = x, F ′(X) = i) =
∑
j∈Z
P (X = x, f(X) = j, F ′(X) = i)
= P (X = x, f(X) = f(x))PF ′(X)|f(X) (i|f(x)) , by (7)
= PX(x)V (i|f (x) )
= PX(x)W (i|x), by (12).
Hence, by (13),
1− piρ(V ) = P
(
gMAP (V )(F
′ (X) ) = X
)
=
∑
i∈Z
max
x∈X
PX(x)W (i|x)
5= 1− piρ(W ).
Conversely, given an add-noise ρ-QR V : Z → Z , consider a stochastic matrix W = W (V ) : X → Z with
identical rows for all x ∈ f−1(i), i ∈ Z , defined by (12). By the same steps as above, this W is a ρ-QR and,
furthermore, piρ(W ) = piρ(V ). 
A justification of our model above is warranted. Our choice of the probability of error as a measure of
recoverability as well as privacy is driven by considerations of tractability and obtaining exact answers, as indicated
in Section I. In particular, it enables us to identify optimal or asymptotically optimal ρ-QRs in our achievability
proofs. In symmetry with the pointwise measure of recoverability in X = x in (1) or (2), it would be preferable to
consider a redolent measure of privacy in (8), (11) that is pointwise in Z = i, viz.
max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
max
i∈Z
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X | Z = i).
However, such conservatism leads to intractability; by contrast, our liberal choice in (8), (11), which is equivalent
to
max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
max
i∈Z
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X, Z = i), (14)
makes for comprehensive analysis as will be seen below; the equivalence of (14) is explained in the remark following
the proof of Theorem 2 in the next section.
Concerning ρ-recoverability, we add that there is no loss of generality in (1), (2) by not considering an estimate
of f(X) on the basis of F (X); this is so, because the user can emulate any such estimation strategy of the querier
to produce yet another ρ-QR.
Lastly, a seemingly more general setting comprising “private data X, correlated nonprivate data Y and publicly
released data Z” is addressed below; see Remark (iii) after the proof of Proposition 3.
III. ρ-PRIVACY FOR A SINGLE QUERY RESPONSE
A characterization of ρ-privacy is provided by obtaining first an upper bound for pi(ρ) and then identifying
explicitly an add-noise ρ-QR whose privacy meets the bound.
Let
x∗ = arg max
x∈X
PX (x) , x
∗
i = arg max
x∈f−1(i)
PX (x) , i ∈ Z (15)
and suppose that x∗ ∈ f−1 (i∗) for some i∗ ∈ Z, where x∗, i∗ and x∗i , i ∈ Z, need not be unique. Further, set
ρc =
PX (x
∗)∑
i∈Z
PX (x∗i )
(16)
and observe that 1/k ≤ ρc < 1, where the left inequality is by
PX (x
∗)∑
i∈Z
PX (x∗i )
≥
PX (x
∗)∑
i∈Z
PX (x∗)
=
1
k
.
The following choice of ρ-QR W = Wo : X → Z will play a material role in the achievability proof of ρ-privacy
in Theorem 2 below:
Wo (i|x) =


max{ρc, ρ}, i = f(x)(
1−max{ρc, ρ}
)
PX(x∗i )∑
l 6=f(x)
PX(x∗l )
, i 6= f(x), x ∈ X , i ∈ Z. (17)
We note that Wo has the property that for each i ∈ Z , all rows of Wo corresponding to x ∈ f
−1 (i) are identical.
By dint of Lemma 1, the associated stochastic matrix Vo : Z → Z given by
Vo (i|j) = Wo (i|x) for every x ∈ f
−1 (j)
6ρ0 ρc 1
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
1− PX (x
∗)
pi(ρ)
Fig. 1: pi(ρ) vs. ρ.
=


max{ρc, ρ}, i = j(
1−max{ρc, ρ}
)
PX(x∗i )∑
l 6=j
PX(x∗l )
, i 6= j, i, j ∈ Z (18)
will be also of consequence in achieving ρ-privacy.
An exact characterization of ρ-privacy is provided by
Theorem 2. ρ-privacy equals
pi (ρ) = 1−max
{
PX (x
∗) , ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
}
= 1−max {ρc, ρ}
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (19)
Furthermore, ρ-privacy is achieved by the ρ-QR Wo in (17) and, additionally, by the add-noise ρ-QR Vo in (18).
Remarks:
(i) The choice of Wo and Vo in (17) and (18), and the value of ρ-privacy in (19), depend on PX only through
PX (x
∗
i ) , i ∈ Z , i.e., PX
(
f−1(i)
)
2−Hmin(Pi), i ∈ Z , where Hmin(Pi) is the minentropy of the pmf Pi =(
PX(x)/PX
(
f−1(i)
)
, x ∈ f−1(i)
)
.
(ii) By Theorem 2,
pi(ρ) =


1− PX (x
∗) , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc
1− ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) , ρc ≤ ρ ≤ 1
and is plotted in Fig. 1. In particular, for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc, pi(ρ) = 1−PX (x
∗) and is the error of a MAP estimator
of X without any observation. For ρ = 1, pi(1) = 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) is the error of a MAP estimator of X on
the basis of f(X).
(iii) The ρ-privacy achieving ρ-QR Wo and the corresponding add-noise ρ-QR Vo in Theorem 2 are not unique.
For instance, see Remark (ii) after the proof of Proposition 3, Remark (ii) following Theorem 5 and the first
part of the Remark following Theorem 6.
Proof : That the two characterizations of pi(ρ) in (19) are identical follows by straightforward manipulation. We
first show that ρ-privacy cannot exceed the right-side(s) of (19), and then identify a ρ-QR that attains it.
Converse: Clearly
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) = X) ≥ PX (x
∗)
7and for every W : X → Z satisfying (2),
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) = X) =
∑
i∈Z
max
x∈X
PX (x)W (i|x) ≥
∑
i∈Z
max
x∈f−1(i)
PX (x)W (i|x) ≥ ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
leading to
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) = X) ≥ max
{
PX (x
∗) , ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
}
. (20)
Hence
piρ (W ) = P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X) ≤ 1−max
{
PX (x
∗) , ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
}
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (21)
so that the same upper bound, valid for all W : X → Z subject to (2), applies to pi(ρ), too.
Achievability: We show that the choice of the ρ-QR Wo : X → Z in (17) has privacy piρ (Wo) equal to the
right-side(s) of (19). To this end,
1− piρ (Wo) = P (gMAP (Wo) (Z) = X)
=
∑
i∈Z
max
x∈X
PX (x)Wo (i|x)
=
∑
i∈Z
max
{
max
x∈f−1(i)
PX (x)Wo (i|x) , max
x 6∈f−1(i)
PX (x)Wo (i|x)
}
=
∑
i∈Z
max
{
PX (x
∗
i )max{ρc, ρ}, max
x 6∈f−1(i)
PX (x)Wo (i|x)
}
, by (17). (22)
We claim that
PX (x
∗
i )max{ρc, ρ} ≥ max
x 6∈f−1(i)
PX (x)Wo (i|x) , i ∈ Z (23)
whereupon (22) becomes
1− piρ (Wo) = max{ρc, ρ}
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
so that the privacy piρ (Wo) equals the right-side(s) of (19). It remains to establish (23). Considering first the case
0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc, we must show for each x 6∈ f
−1(i) that
PX (x
∗
i ) ρc ≥ PX (x)Wo (i|x)
= PX(x) (1− ρc)
PX (x
∗
i )∑
j 6=f(x)
PX(x
∗
j)
, by (17)
i.e.,
ρc
1− ρc
≥
PX (x)∑
j 6=f(x)
PX(x∗j)
(24)
which, in turn, would follow if
ρc
1− ρc
≥
PX (x
∗)∑
j 6=f(x)
PX(x∗j )
,
which is tantamount to showing that ∑
j 6=i∗
PX(x
∗
j)∑
j 6=f(x)
PX(x∗j )
≤ 1. (25)
8Clearly, (25) holds for each x 6∈ f−1(i), as the denominator is either larger than or equal to the numerator for all
i ∈ Z . For the case ρc ≤ ρ < 1, we must show (24) with ρc replaced by ρ; this follows readily since
ρ
1− ρ
≥
ρc
1− ρc
, ρc ≤ ρ < 1.
For ρ = 1, we have by (17) that Wo (i|x) = 1(i = f (x) ), x ∈ X , i ∈ Z , whereby (23) holds trivially.
Finally, that the add-noise ρ-QR Vo achieves ρ-privacy follows by Lemma 1. 
Remark: The equivalence in (14) is justified by the proof of Theorem 2 which shows, in effect, that a common
maximizer in
arg max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X) = arg max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
∑
i∈Z
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X, Z = i)
= arg max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
max
i∈Z
P (gMAP (W ) (Z) 6= X, Z = i)
is Wo in (17).
We close this section by considering ρ-privacy for a predicate Y = h(X) of X, where h : X → Y =
{0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, 2 ≤ m ≤ r, is a given mapping. Analogously as in Definition 3, predicate privacy1 for a
ρ-QR F (X) or W in (1), (2) is
pi′ρ (F ) = pi
′
ρ (W ) = P (g
′
MAP (W ) (Z) 6= Y )
and predicate ρ-privacy is
pi′(ρ) = max
W :W (f(x)|x)≥ρ
x∈X
pi′ρ(W ). (26)
Clearly, pi′(ρ) ≤ pi(ρ), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, and when h : X → Y = X is the identity mapping, predicate ρ-privacy in (26)
specializes to ρ-privacy in (11).
Proposition 3 below provides an exact characterization of pi′(ρ). Its proof builds on that for pi(ρ) in Theorem 2.
The following additional notation is convenient. Define
j∗ = argmax
j∈Y
PX
(
h−1(j)
)
,
PX(i, j) = PX
(
f−1(i) ∩ h−1(j)
)
, i ∈ Z, j ∈ Y,
j∗i = argmax
j∈Y
PX(i, j), i ∈ Z
and
ρ′c =
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j∗i )
, (27)
where the maxima above need not be attained uniquely. Observe that max
{
1
m
, 1
k
}
≤ ρ′c ≤ 1. The right inequality
is by
ρ′c =
∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j
∗)∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j∗i )
≤ 1
while the left inequality follows from
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j∗i )
≥
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (f−1(i))
= PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)
≥
1
m
1Notation used in the context of ρ-privacy will be primed throughout for predicate ρ-privacy.
9and
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j∗i )
≥
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (h−1(j∗i ))
≥
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)∑
i∈Z
PX (h−1(j∗))
=
1
k
.
Proposition 3. Predicate ρ-privacy equals
pi′(ρ) = 1−max
{
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)
, ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j
∗
i )
}
= 1−max
{
ρ′c, ρ
}∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j
∗
i ) , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (28)
Proof : Starting with the converse part, we have that
P (g′MAP (W ) (Z) = Y ) ≥ PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)
and for every ρ-QR W : X → Z in (2),
P (g′MAP (W ) (Z) = Y ) =
∑
i∈Z
max
j∈Y
∑
x∈h−1(j)
PX(x)W (i|x) ≥ ρ
∑
i∈Z
max
j∈Y
PX(i, j) = ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX(i, j
∗
i )
where the first equality uses
P (Y = j|X = x,Z = i) = 1 (j = h(x)) .
The converse proof is completed similarly as for Theorem 2.
Turning to the achievability part, consider the ρ-QR W ′o : X → Z specified for x ∈ X , i ∈ Z , j ∈ Y , as follows.
For ρ′c = 1
W ′o(i|x) = 1 (f(x) = i) (29)
and for ρ′c < 1,
W ′o(i|x) =


max{ρ′c, ρ}+ (1−max{ρ
′
c, ρ})
PX(i,j∗i )−PX(i,j)∑
l∈Z
PX(l,j∗l )−PX(h
−1(j)) , i = f(x), j = h(x)
(1−max{ρ′c, ρ})
PX(i,j∗i )−PX(i,j)∑
l∈Z
PX(l,j∗l )−PX(h
−1(j)) , i 6= f(x), j = h(x).
(30)
Since ρ′c < 1, observe in (30) that∑
l∈Z
PX (l, j
∗
l )− PX
(
h−1(j)
)
≥
∑
l∈Z
PX (l, j
∗
l )− PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)
> 0.
We show in Appendix A that pi′ρ(W
′
o) equals the right-side of (28).
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Remarks:
(i) Note that W ′o has the property that for each i in Z , j in Y , all rows corresponding to x in f
−1(i) ∩ h−1(j)
are identical. Pursuant to Lemma 1, W ′o can be interpreted as an add-noise ρ-QR obtained by adding to f(X)
a noise N that satisfies the Markov condition N −◦− f(X), h(X) −◦− X.
(ii) When h is the identity mapping, W ′o in (30) does not coincide with Wo in (17); in fact, W
′
o reduces to
W ′′o (i|x) =


max{ρc, ρ}+ (1−max{ρc, ρ})
PX(x∗i )−PX(x)∑
l∈Z
PX(x∗l )−PX(x)
, i = f(x),
(1−max{ρc, ρ})
PX(x∗i )−PX(x)∑
l∈Z
PX(x∗l )−PX(x)
, i 6= f(x).
By Proposition 3 and Theorem 2, pi′ρ (W
′′
o ) = pi(ρ) = piρ (Wo). On the other hand, and unlike Wo, the ρ-QR
W ′′o is not of the add-noise type in the sense of Definition 2 and also depends on the entirety of PX .
(iii) Proposition 3 covers the setting when privacy is sought for a randomized function Y of the data X with
the (finite-valued) rvs X,Y having a given joint pmf. Specifically ρ-privacy for Y corresponds to predicate
ρ-privacy in Proposition 3 with X¯ , h(X¯), f(X¯) and F (X¯), where
X¯ = (X,Y ), h(X¯) = Y, f(X¯) = f(X), F (X¯) = Z,
(with an abuse of notation in f ).
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(iv) In a similar vein, Proposition 3 also covers the setting with “private data X, correlated nonprivate data Y
and publicly released data Z” alluded to in Section I. Formally, ρ-privacy for the mentioned setting equals
predicate ρ-privacy in Proposition 3 applied to X˜, h(X˜), f(X˜) and F (X˜), where
X˜ = (X,Y ), h(X˜) = X, f(X˜) = Y, F (X˜) = Z.
IV. MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT QUERY RESPONSES
In a general setting, given a mapping f : X → Z, a querier wishes to compute f(x), x ∈ X , from ρ-QRs
{(Ft(x), x ∈ X )}
n
t=1 , n ≥ 1. The rvs {Ft (X)}
n
t=1 are taken to be conditionally mutually independent, conditioned
on X, but not necessarily identically distributed, with each Ft (X) satisfying the ρ-recoverability condition (1).
Correspondingly, consider stochastic matrices {Wt : X → Z}
n
t=1 such that
P (F1 (X) = i1, . . . , Fn (X) = in|X = x) =
n∏
t=1
P (Ft (X) = it|X = x)
=
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x) , x ∈ X , i1, . . . , in ∈ Z (31)
say, with each Wt satisfying (2). Similarly, for add-noise ρ-QRs Ft(X) as in Definition 2 with {Vt : Z →
Z where Vt(i|i) ≥ ρ, i ∈ Z}
n
t=1,
P (F1 (X) = i1, . . . , Fn (X) = in|X = x) =
n∏
t=1
Vt(it|f(x)), x ∈ X , i1, . . . , in ∈ Z. (32)
In all contexts, denote Zt = Ft (X) , t = 1, . . . , n.
This formulation is apposite when the main objective of the querier is to improve its estimation accuracy (beyond
ρ) of a given f(X) by soliciting multiple ρ-QRs whereas the user designs said ρ-QRs so as to maximize the privacy
of its data X. A different formulation in which an “adversarial querier” elicits multiple ρ-QRs for various choices
of functions in order to destroy data privacy by isolating the value of X, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Remark: In addition to possibly eroding privacy, multiple ρ-QRs enable the querier to estimate f(X) with a
probability that can exceed ρ. Precisely, for a MAP estimator hMAP of f(X) on the basis of {Ft (X)}
n
t=1 in (31),
we have
P (hMAP (F1(X), . . . , Fn(X)) = f(X)) ≥ max
{
ρ,max
i∈Z
P (f(X) = i) , P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)}
(33)
where Bin(n, ρ) is a binomial rv with parameters n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. In particular, for 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1, the right-side
of (33) tends to 1 as n→∞. See Appendix C and Lemma 7.
Definition 5. For each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and n ≥ 1, the ρ-privacy that can be attained by ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 as in (31)
with each Ft(X) satisfying (1) (or equivalently each Wt satisfying (2)) is
pin (ρ) = max
W1,...,Wn:
Wt(f(x)|x)≥ρ, x∈X
piρ (W1, . . . ,Wn) ,
where
piρ (W1, . . . ,Wn) = min
gn
P (gn (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X),
with the minimum being taken over all estimators gn : Z
n → X on the basis of {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 . Thus,
piρ (W1, . . . ,Wn) = P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X) (34)
where
gMAP (W1,...,Wn) (i1, . . . , in) = arg max
x∈X
PX (x)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x) , i1, . . . , in ∈ Z.
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Similarly, for add-noise ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 as in (32), we define
piρ (V1, . . . , Vn) = P (gMAP (V1, . . . , Vn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X) (35)
with
gMAP (V1,...,Vn) (i1, . . . , in) = arg max
x∈X
PX (x)
n∏
t=1
Vt(it|f(x)), i1, . . . , in ∈ Z.
Of particular interest will be the cases Wt = W or Vt = V, t = 1, . . . , n, when we write (34) and (35) as
piρ (W
n) = P (gMAP (Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X)
and
piρ (V
n) = P (gMAP (V n) (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X).
We provide first in Section IV-A an upper bound for ρ-privacy pin(ρ) which is valid for each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and
every n ≥ 1. Next, in Section IV-B, considering the realms 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5 separately, we show
corresponding explicit achievability schemes. However, unlike in Section III for the case n = 1, the lower bound
for pin(ρ) from the achievability schemes below, that use add-noise ρ-QRs, need not coincide with the upper bound
in Theorem 4 for any finite n ≥ 1. These upper and lower bounds for pin(ρ) are rendered into more convenient,
albeit blunter forms in Section IV-C.
IV-A. Converse
We provide next, as a converse result, an upper bound for pin(ρ), n ≥ 1. For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, set
Γn(ρ) = min
{
1− ρc,min
{
1− ρ, P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)}}∑
i∈Z
PX(x
∗
i ), n ≥ 1 (36)
and note that 0 ≤ Γn(ρ) ≤ 1.
Theorem 4. For each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and for every n ≥ 1,
pin(ρ) ≤ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX(x
∗
i ) + Γn(ρ).
Remark: For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and n = 1, since
Γ1(ρ) = (1−max{ρc, ρ})
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) ,
we have that the upper bound for pin(ρ) above reduces to that for pi(ρ) in the right-side of (21).
Proof : For W1, . . . ,Wn satisfying (2),
P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) ≥ P (gMAP (W1) (Z1) = X)
≥ max
{
PX (x
∗) , ρ
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
}
(37)
by (20). Also,
P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) =
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈X
PX (x)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x) . (38)
For each i ∈ Z and for l =
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1, . . . , n, set
Al(i) = {(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n : i occurs l times in (i1, . . . , in)} . (39)
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Then, in (38),
P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) ≥
∑
i∈Z
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Al(i)
max
x∈X
PX (x)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x)
≥
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Al(i)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x
∗
i )
=
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) si(n) (40)
where
si(n) =
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
sli(n) (41)
with
sli(n) =
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Al(i)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x
∗
i ) , i ∈ Z. (42)
To understand the functional dependence of sli(n) on (W1 (i|x
∗
i ) , . . . ,Wn (i|x
∗
i ) ), consider as an instance all
(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Al(i) with i1 = . . . = il = i and it 6= i, t = l + 1, . . . , n. The corresponding sum for such
(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Al(i) in (42) equals(
l∏
t=1
Wt (i|x
∗
i )
) ∑
(il+1,...,in)∈Zn−l
it 6=i, t=l+1,...,n
n∏
t=l+1
Wt (it|x
∗
i ) =
(
l∏
t=1
Wt (i|x
∗
i )
)
n∏
t=l+1
(1−Wt (i|x
∗
i )) .
In this manner, we observe that sli(n) reduces to a sum of
(
n
l
)
terms (corresponding to the locations of l is), each
of which is a product of Wt (i|x
∗
i )-terms for l locations of t in {1, . . . , n} corresponding to occurrences of i, and
(1−Wt (i|x
∗
i ) )-terms in the remaining (n− l) locations. Thus, s
l
i(n) is a function of (W1 (i|x
∗
i ) , . . . ,Wn (i|x
∗
i ) ).
We seek a suitable lower bound for si(n) in terms of ρ and n, to which end we make the
Claim: For i ∈ Z, si(n) is a nondecreasing function of each Wt (i|x
∗
i ) , t = 1, . . . , n.
By (41), the claim and the observation following (42), si(n) is bounded below in an identical manner for
i = 0, 1, . . . , k−1, upon replacing eachW1 (i|x
∗
i ) , . . . ,Wn (i|x
∗
i ) by ρ, in accordance with (2). By said observation,
we have from (41) for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 that
si(n) ≥
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l
= P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
. (43)
Then from (40),
P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) ≥
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
. (44)
Combining (37) and (44), we get
P (gMAP (W1, . . . ,Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) ≥ max
{
PX (x
∗) ,
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
max
{
ρ, P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)}}
= max
{
ρc,max
{
ρ, P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)}}∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
=
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )− Γn(ρ)
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

ρ 1− ρ 0 0 · · ·
1− ρ ρ 0 0 · · ·
0 0 ρ 1− ρ · · ·
0 0 1− ρ ρ · · ·
. . .
· · · ρ 1− ρ
· · · 1− ρ ρ


(a) k even


ρ 1− ρ 0 0 · · ·
1− ρ ρ 0 0 · · ·
0 0 ρ 1− ρ · · ·
0 0 1− ρ ρ · · ·
. . .
· · · ρ 1− ρ 0
0 0 · · · 1− ρ ρ 0
1− ρ 0 · · · ρ


(b) k odd
Fig. 2: Add-noise ρ-QR V1.
from which the assertion of the theorem follows since W1, . . . ,Wn were arbitrary subject to (2).
It remains to establish the claim, and it suffices to do so with i = 0, t = 1, i.e., we show that s0(n) is
nondecreasing in W1 (0|x
∗
0). From the observation following (42), s
l
0(n) is a sum of
(
n
l
)
terms, each of which
is a product of Wt (0|x
∗
0)-terms for l locations of t in {1, . . . , n} where 0s occur and (1 −Wt (0|x
∗
0) )-terms for
the remaining (n − l) locations. Thus, each of these
(
n
l
)
terms will have either W1 (0|x
∗
0) or 1 −W1 (0|x
∗
0) in it
(depending on whether or not i1 = 0). The latter possibility yields a term with −W1 (0|x
∗
0) which is seen to be
canceled by a suitable term from sl+10 (n). Also, s
n
0 (n) = W1 (0|x
∗
0)
n∏
t=2
Wt (0|x
∗
0) . Thus, s0(n) consists of terms
with +W1 (0|x
∗
0) or with no W1 (0|x
∗
0) , and thereby is linear and nondecreasing in W1 (0|x
∗
0) . This proves the
claim. 
IV-B. Achievability
Throughout our achievability proofs, for the sake of convenience and without loss of essential generality, we
assume that
PX(x
∗
i ) ≥ PX(x
∗
i+1), i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2. (45)
IV-B1. Realm 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1:
Our achievability scheme uses the following stochastic matrix V1 : Z → Z , not depending on PX , given by
V1(i|j) =


ρ, i = j
1− ρ, j even and i = j + 1 mod k or j odd and i = j − 1
0, otherwise,
(46)
for i, j ∈ Z. Thus, for k even, the k × k-matrix V1 is block-diagonal with exactly k/2 blocks of 2× 2-matrices[
ρ 1− ρ
1− ρ ρ
]
.
For k odd, the upper-left (k− 1)× (k− 1)-submatrix of V1 is similarly structured with (k− 1)/2 such blocks, and
with the kth row being V1(0|k − 1) = 1− ρ and V1(k − 1|k − 1) = ρ. See Fig. 2. Corresponding to V1 : Z → Z
in (46), consider the conditionally i.i.d. ρ-QRs {Zt = Ft(X)}
n
t=1 given by (32) as
P (F1 (X) = i1, . . . , Fn (X) = in|X = x) =
n∏
t=1
V1 (it|f(x)) . (47)
For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, set
Λn(ρ) = P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)( ∑
i∈Z: i odd
PX (x
∗
i )
)
, n ≥ 1 (48)
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and note that 0 ≤ Λn(ρ) ≤ 1.
Theorem 5. Let 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1. For every n ≥ 1, the add-noise ρ-QRs {Zt = Ft(X)}
n
t=1 in (47) with V1 : Z → Z
in (46) yield privacy
piρ (V
n
1 ) ≥ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) + Λn(ρ). (49)
Remarks:
(i) The choice of V1 : Z → Z takes its cue from the proof of Theorem 4. The first lower bound in (40) results
upon discarding those (i1, . . . , in) in Z
n in which the most frequent symbol from Z occurs no more than⌊
n
2
⌋
times. The specific choice of V1 in (46) ensures that the number of such occurrences is at least
⌊
n
2
⌋
+1.
(ii) Observe that when PX is the uniform pmf on X , for n = 1, piρ (V1) = 1− kρ/r = pi(ρ), the latter by (19).
On the other hand, piρ (V1) can be strictly smaller than pi(ρ); for instance for X = Z = {0, 1, 2}, PX =
(0.5, 0.3, 0.2), f(x) = x, and ρ = 0.6, it is straightforward to show that pi(ρ) = 0.4 whereas piρ (V1) = 0.38.
Proof : We have
P (gMAP(V n1 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) =
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈X
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x)). (50)
When ρ = 1, V1 : Z → Z in (46) has 1s along its diagonal and 0s elsewhere. Hence, the right-side of (50) equals∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) . Since Λn(1) = 0, (49) holds (with equality).
Hereafter we take 0.5 < ρ < 1. By the form of V1 in (46), for each x ∈ X only those (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n yield
nonzero contributions in (50) when consisting of it = f(x); and it = f(x)+1 mod k for f(x) even or it = f(x)−1
for f(x) odd. Accordingly, we distinguish between the cases when k is even or it is odd.
(i) k even: For i = 0, 2, . . . , k − 2, set
Bn(i) = { (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n : it = i or it = i+ 1}. (51)
Then in (50),
P (gMAP(V n1 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) =
∑
i=0,2,...,k−2
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Bn(i)
max
x∈f−1(i)∪f−1(i+1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x)) (52)
where for each i = 0, 2, . . . , k − 2 and for each (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Bn(i),
max
x∈f−1(i)∪f−1(i+1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x)) =
max
{
PX(x
∗
i )ρ
li(i1,...,in) (1− ρ)n−li(i1,...,in) , PX(x
∗
i+1) (1− ρ)
li(i1,...,in) ρn−li(i1,...,in)
}
(53)
with li (i1, . . . , in) being the number of is in (i1, . . . , in). The first term in {·, ·} above is no larger than the second
if
li (i1, . . . , in) ≤ τn(i, ρ) ,
1
2

n− log
P (x∗i )
P(x∗i+1)
log
ρ
1−ρ


 .
Since 0.5 < ρ < 1, we observe by the assumption in (45) that τn(i, ρ) ≤ ⌊
n
2 ⌋; and τn(i, ρ) ≤
n
2 − 1 for even
2 n.
Then for i = 0, 2, . . . , k − 2 and when τn(i, ρ) ≥ 0, by (53) we get in (52) that∑
(i1,...,in)∈Bn(i)
max
x∈f−1(i)∪f−1(i+1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x))
2When P (x∗i ) = P (x
∗
i+1) , we get τn(i, ρ) = n/2 for even n. In this case, replacing τn(i, ρ) = n/2 by τn(i, ρ) = n/2 − 1 does not
alter subsequent calculations.
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= PX(x
∗
i+1)
τn(i,ρ)∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(1− ρ)l ρn−l + PX(x
∗
i )
n∑
l=τn(i,ρ)+1
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l
= PX(x
∗
i+1)
n∑
l=n−τn(i,ρ)
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l + PX(x
∗
i )
n∑
l=τn(i,ρ)+1
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l
≤ PX(x
∗
i+1)
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l + PX(x
∗
i )
n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
ρl (1− ρ)n−l (54)
where the first term in the previous inequality readily follows from the observation above, since
n− τn(i, ρ) ≥
{
n−
⌊
n
2
⌋
≥
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1 for odd n
n
2 + 1 for even n.
Note that when τn(i, ρ) < 0, this upper bound in (54) remains valid. By (52) and (54),
P (gMAP(V n1 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X)
≤
∑
i=0,2,...,k−2
[
PX
(
x∗i+1
)
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+ PX (x
∗
i )P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+ PX (x
∗
i )P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋) ]
=
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+

 ∑
i=0,2,...,k−2
PX (x
∗
i )

P (Bin(n, ρ) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋)
(55)
=
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )− Λn(ρ). (56)
(ii) k odd: For i = 0, 2, . . . , k − 3, set Bn(i) as in (51), and
Bn(k − 1) = { (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n : it = 0 or it = k − 1}.
Then
P (gMAP(V n1 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X)
≤
∑
i=0,2,...,k−3
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Bn(i)
max
x∈f−1(i)∪f−1(i+1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x)) (57)
+
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Bn(k−1)
max
x∈f−1(k−1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V1(it|f(x))
≤
(
k−2∑
i=0
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+
∑
i=0,2,...,k−3
PX (x
∗
i )P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)
+ PX
(
x∗k−1
)(
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+ P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋))
=
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+

 ∑
i=0,2,...,k−1
PX (x
∗
i )

P (Bin(n, ρ) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋)
=
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )− Λn(ρ) (58)
where in the inequality above, the first two terms on the right-side obtain a la (55). When (i1, . . . , in) = (0, . . . , 0)
(the all-zero sequence), the maximum in (57) is over x in f−1(0)∪f−1(1)∪f−1(k−1). The preceding calculations
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are, in effect over x in f−1(0), and are justified since PX (x
∗
0) ρ
n ≥ PX (x
∗
1) (1− ρ)
n ≥ PX
(
x∗k−1
)
(1− ρ)n for
0.5 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The assertion of the theorem holds by (56) and (58). 
IV-B2. Realm 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5:
Our achievability scheme uses ρ-QRs as in (47) with V1 replaced by V2 : Z → Z , not depending on PX , which is:
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1/k,
V2(i|j) =
1
k
, i, j ∈ Z (59)
and for 1/k < ρ ≤ 0.5,
V2(i|j) =


1⌊
1
ρ
⌋ , j = 0, . . . ,
⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋
− 1, i =
⌊
j⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋
, . . . ,
(⌊
j⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋
+ 1
)⌊
1
ρ
⌋
− 1
1
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋ , j =
⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋
, . . . , k − 1, i =
⌊
j⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋ ⌊
1
ρ
⌋
, . . . , k − 1
0, otherwise.
(60)
In particular, for 1/k < ρ ≤ 0.5, the k× k-matrix V2 consists of
⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋
diagonal blocks of
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
×
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
-matrices,
each with identical elements equal to 1/
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
; and a single “filler” block of size k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
× k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
with
identical elements equal to 1/
(
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
. The latter is vacuous if
⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋
= k, i.e., k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
= 0. See
Fig. 3.


1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0
1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0
1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2


Fig. 3: Add-noise ρ-QR V2 for ρ = 1/3 and k = 8.
Theorem 6. Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5. For every n ≥ 1, the add-noise ρ-QRs {Zt = Ft(X)}
n
t=1 in (47) with V1 replaced
by V2 : Z → Z in (59), (60) yield privacy
piρ (V
n
2 ) =


1− PX (x
∗) , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
k
1−
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)
, k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
6= 0, 1
k
< ρ ≤ 0.5
1−
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)
, k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
= 0, 1
k
< ρ ≤ 0.5.
(61)
Remark: For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, the privacy piρ (V
n
2 ) above lacks dependence on n. However, for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1/k,
piρ (V
n
2 ) = piρ (V2) = 1− PX (x
∗) = pi(ρ)
where the last identity is by (19). Thus, for n = 1, the add-noise ρ-QR with V2 too achieves ρ-privacy, as did Vo
in Theorem 2.
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On the other hand, for 1/k < ρ ≤ 0.5, V2 can be strictly inferior to Vo for n = 1; for instance, with PX being
the uniform pmf on X , by Theorem 6 with k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
6= 0,
piρ (V2) = 1−


 k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
+ 1

 1
r
< 1−
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋ 1
r
≤ 1−
ρk
r
= pi(ρ) = pi(Vo)
where the last two identities are by Theorem 2.
Proof : We have
P (gMAP(V n2 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) =
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈X
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V2(it|f(x)). (62)
When 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1/k, we get from (59) that
P (gMAP(V n2 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X) = PX (x
∗)
so that piρ (V
n
2 ) = 1− PX (x
∗) . Considering next 1/k < ρ ≤ 0.5, by the form of V2 in (60), for each
x ∈ X \

f−1


 k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌊1
ρ
⌋ ∪ . . . ∪ f−1(k − 1)


only those (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n yield nonzero contributions in (62) when
it ∈


f(x)⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌊1
ρ
⌋
, . . . ,


f(x)⌊
1
ρ
⌋
+ 1

⌊1
ρ
⌋
− 1

 , t = 1, . . . , n,
and for each
x ∈

f−1


 k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌊1
ρ
⌋ ∪ . . . ∪ f−1(k − 1)


only those (i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n yield nonzero contributions in (62) when
it ∈


f(x)⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌊1
ρ
⌋
, . . . , k − 1

 , t = 1, . . . , n.
For i = 0, . . . ,
(⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋
− 1
)
, set
Cn(i) =
{
(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Z
n : it ∈
{
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
, . . . , (i+ 1)
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
− 1
}}
and, when the filler block above exists,
Cn


 k⌊
1
ρ
⌋


 =

(i1, . . . , in) ∈ Zn : it ∈


 k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌊1
ρ
⌋
, . . . , k − 1



 .
Then in (62), with the filler block existing
P
(
gMAP(V n2 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X
)
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn(i)
max
x∈f−1
(
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1
(
(i+1)
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
−1
) PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V2(it|f(x))
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+
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋) max
x∈f−1
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1(k−1)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V2(it|f(x))
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn(i)
max
x∈f−1
(
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1
(
(i+1)
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
−1
) PX(x)

 1⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n
+
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋) max
x∈f−1
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1(k−1)
PX(x)

 1
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0

 1⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn(i)
max
x∈f−1
(
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1
(
(i+1)
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
−1
) PX(x)
+

 1
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋) max
x∈f−1
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋)
∪...∪f−1(k−1)
PX(x)
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0

 1⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn(i)
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)
+

 1
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋


n ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Cn
(⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋)PX

x∗⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋⌊
1
ρ
⌋

 (63)
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)
,
where (63) uses (45) and |Cn(i)| =
(⌊
1
ρ
⌋)n
,
∣∣∣∣Cn
(⌊
k⌊
1
ρ
⌋
⌋)∣∣∣∣ = (k mod ⌊ 1ρ⌋)n. In the absence of the filler block,
clearly
P
(
gMAP(V n2 ) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X
)
=
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)
.
The assertion of the theorem follows. 
IV-C. Useful Bounds for pin(ρ)
Theorems 4 and 5 yield effective upper and lower bounds for pin(ρ). Upon rewriting these bounds with a slight
weakening, useful information can be extracted concerning the limiting behaviour of pin(ρ) as n→∞. Specifically
by Theorem 4, for each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and for every n ≥ 1,
pin(ρ) ≤ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX(x
∗
i ) + Γn(ρ) (64)
and by Theorem 5, for 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1 and for every n ≥ 1,
pin(ρ) ≥ piρ (V
n
1 ) ≥ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) + Λn(ρ). (65)
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Estimates of P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋)
appearing in Γn(ρ) and Λn(ρ) (cf. (36) and (48)) lead to useful bounds for
pin(ρ) in (64) and (65). Let Ber(α) denote a Bernoulli rv with the probability of “1” being α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Hereafter,
all logarithms and exponentials are with respect to the base 2.
Lemma 7. (i) For each 0.5 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and every n ≥ 1,
1
n+ 1
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋)∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber(ρ))] ≤ P (Bin(n, ρ) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋)
≤
(⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋)∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber(ρ))] .
(ii) For each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5 and for every n ≥ 1,
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)
≥ 1− ρ.
Proof : See Appendix B. 
Lemma 7(i) leads to the following useful bounds for pin(ρ).
Proposition 8. For each 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1,
(i)
pin (ρ) ≤ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) +
(⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋)∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ))]∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
for all n such that (⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋)∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber(ρ))] ≤ 1−min{ρ, ρc}.
(ii) for every n ≥ 1,
pin (ρ) ≥ piρ (V
n
1 ) ≥ 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) +
1
n+ 1
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋)∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber(ρ))]
( ∑
i∈Z: i odd
PX (x
∗
i )
)
.
Proof : The assertions follow directly by applying the upper and lower bounds in Lemma 7(i) to the right-sides
of (64) and (65), respectively, and recalling (36) and (48). 
IV-D. Asymptotic Implications
We close this section with useful asymptotic implications of Theorem 4, 5, 6 and Proposition 8. Considering first
the (more interesting) realm 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1, the upper bounds for pin(ρ) in Theorem 4 and Proposition 8(i), as also
the lower bounds in Theorem 5 and Proposition 8(ii), converge according to
lim
n
pin(ρ) = 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) = pi(1), 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1 (66)
(see Remark (ii) after Theorem 2), i.e., the error probability of a MAP estimator of X on the basis of a knowledge
of f(X). Furthermore, both the sets of bounds converge at the same exponential rate in n with the (n-dependent)
exponent itself tending to D(Ber(0.5)||Ber(ρ)) > 0. Thus, in the realm 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1, the asymptotic privacy
in (66) is that which is afforded when the querier forms an accurate MAP estimate of f(X) w.p. 1 from ρ-QRs
{Ft(X)}
n
t=1 , followed by a MAP estimate of X that is compatible with the estimated f(X).
In the realm 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, the upper bound for pin(ρ) in Theorem 4, by Lemma 7(ii), equals
1−max{ρc, ρ}
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) (67)
for all n ≥ 1, which is the ρ-privacy for n = 1 in Theorem 2. As remarked after Theorem 6, this upper bound is
unattainable, in general, by add-noise ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 with V2 : Z → Z in (59), (60). Hence, an interpretation
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as above in the complementary realm is lacking as is the answer to the putative tightness (or not) of the mentioned
bound. However, since
pin(ρ) ≥ piρ (V
n
2 ) > 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i ) = pi(1),
where the strict inequality is evident from Theorem 6 (by comparing the expressions in (61) with 1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )),
we can conclude that no accurate estimate of f(X) w.p. 1 is possible from ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 for any n, unlike
for 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1.
V. INADEQUACY OF CONDITIONALLY I.I.D Wo FOR MULTIPLE QUERY RESPONSES
Theorem 2 establishes the optimality of the add-noise ρ-QR Wo : X → Z , or equivalently Vo : Z → Z , in
achieving ρ-privacy pi(ρ), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, for n = 1. Upon choosing Wt = Wo or Vt = Vo, t = 1, . . . , n, n ≥ 2, in (31)
or (32), respectively, how does the corresponding privacy piρ (W
n
o ) or piρ (V
n
o ) compare with the achievable privacy
in Theorems 5 and 6? In the regime of all suitably large n, we show below that the former does not exceed the
latter and, in fact, can be strictly smaller.
To this end, the concept of Chernoff information [8] plays a material role. Given a stochastic matrix V : Z → Z ,
define its Chernoff radius, denoted C(V ), as the minimum of pairwise Chernoff information quantities:
C(V ) = min
j 6=j′
j,j′∈Z
C(j, j′)
= min
j 6=j′
j,j′∈Z
[
− min
0≤λ≤1
log
(∑
i∈Z
V (i|j)λV
(
i|j′
)1−λ)]
, (68)
noting that C(V ) ≥ 0 with C(V ) > 0 iff all the rows of V are distinct.
Also useful will be the next two technical lemmas. Let f˜(X) be a Z-valued rv with pmf
P
(
f˜(X) = i
)
=
PX(x
∗
i )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
) , i ∈ Z
with x∗i , i ∈ Z, as in (15). Let Z˜t, t = 1, . . . , n, be conditionally mutually independent Z-valued rvs conditioned
on f˜(X), with
P
Z˜t|f˜(X)
= V, t = 1, . . . , n.
We use the notation A
.
= exp(−nB) to mean lim
n
−
1
n
logA = B (cf. e.g., [23]).
Lemma 9. For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, consider add-noise ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
∞
t=1 with (31) holding for every n ≥ 1, where
Wt = W, t ≥ 1, and W : X → Z has identical rows for all x ∈ f
−1(i), i ∈ Z, and has associated V : Z → Z
in (12).
(i) The corresponding privacy for every n ≥ 1 is
piρ (W
n) = piρ (V
n) = 1−
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
gMAP (V n)
(
Z˜1, . . . , Z˜n
)
= f˜(X)
)
. (69)
(ii) Furthermore,
piρ (V
n)−
(
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
.
= exp [−nC(V )] . (70)
Proof :
(i)
P
(
gMAP(Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X
)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈X
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
W (it|x)
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=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈∪f−1(j)
j∈Z
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
W (it|x)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
PX
(
x∗j
) n∏
t=1
W
(
it|x
∗
j
)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
PX
(
x∗j
) n∏
t=1
V
(
it|f
(
x∗j
))
, by (12)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
PX(x
∗
j )
n∏
t=1
V (it|j) (71)
=
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
) ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
PX(x
∗
j)∑
i∈Z
PX (x∗i )
n∏
t=1
V (it|j)
=
(∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
gMAP(V n)
(
Z˜1, . . . , Z˜n
)
= f˜(X)
)
(72)
where the third equality above is by the assumed form of W.
The first assertion in (69) follows from (71) and the second from (72).
(ii) By [23, Theorem 2],
P
(
gMAP(V n)
(
Z˜1, . . . , Z˜n
)
6= f˜(X)
)
.
= exp [−nC(V )] ,
which, applied to (69), yields (70).

Remark: Observe that a direct application of [23, Theorem 2] to
piρ (W
n) = P
(
gMAP(Wn) (Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= X
)
is not useful as it yields
piρ (W
n)
.
= exp [−nC(W )]
where the Chernoff radius of W : X → Z is C(W ) = 0 owing to the presence of identical rows when k ≤ r − 1.
Lemma 10. For Vo in (18) and V1 in (46), we have
C (V1) = D(Ber(0.5)||Ber(ρ)) = − log 2
√
ρ(1− ρ), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (73)
and for 0.5 < ρ < 1
C (Vo) = − log 2
√
max{ρc, ρ} (1−max{ρc, ρ}), k = 2 (74)
C (Vo) > − log 2
√
max{ρc, ρ} (1−max{ρc, ρ}), k ≥ 3. (75)
Proof : First observe that for 0 < ρ < 1,
C (V1) = sup
0<λ<1
log
1
ρλ (1− ρ)1−λ + ρ1−λ (1− ρ)λ
= log
1
inf
0<λ<1
ρλ (1− ρ)1−λ + ρ1−λ (1− ρ)λ
= log
1
2
√
ρ(1− ρ)
(76)
= D(Ber(0.5)||Ber(ρ))
where the infimum is attained as a minimum at λ = 0.5; and C(V1) = ∞ for ρ = 0 and ρ = 1. The last equality
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above is by simple calculation.
Turning to (74), for k = 2,
C (Vo) = sup
0<λ<1
log
1
(max{ρc, ρ})
λ (1−max{ρc, ρ})
1−λ + (max{ρc, ρ})
1−λ (1−max{ρc, ρ})
λ
= log
1
2
√
max{ρc, ρ} (1−max{ρc, ρ})
,
in the manner of (76).
To show (75), for j 6= j′ in Z,
C
(
j, j′
)
= sup
0<λ<1
log
1∑
i∈Z
Vo(i|j)λVo(i|j′)1−λ
= sup
0<λ<1
(1− λ)Dλ(Vo(.|j)||Vo(.|j
′)) (77)
where Dλ is the Re´nyi divergence of order λ [30]. For each λ ∈ (0, 1), since Dλ satisfies the data processing
theorem [13, Theorem 1], we get
Dλ(Vo(.|j)||Vo(.|j
′)) ≥ Dλ
(
Ber
(
Vo(j
′|j)
)
||Ber
(
Vo(j
′|j′)
))
= Dλ

Ber

 PX(x∗j′)∑
l 6=j
PX
(
x∗l
)(1−max{ρc, ρ})

∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber(max{ρc, ρ})

 . (78)
Claim: For k ≥ 3 and 0.5 < ρ < 1, the right-side of (78) is strictly larger than
Dλ (Ber (1−max{ρc, ρ}) ||Ber(max{ρc, ρ})) .
Then applying the claim to (77), for all j 6= j′ in Z,
C(j, j′) > sup
0<λ<1
(1− λ)Dλ (Ber (1−max{ρc, ρ}) ||Ber(max{ρc, ρ}))
≥ 0.5D0.5 (Ber (1−max{ρc, ρ}) ||Ber(max{ρc, ρ}))
= − log 2
√
max{ρc, ρ}(1 −max{ρc, ρ})
which yields (75).
It remains to prove the claim. Note that for k ≥ 3, PX(x
∗
j′)
/∑
l 6=j
PX (x
∗
l ) < 1 and so
PX(x
∗
j′)∑
l 6=j
PX
(
x∗l
)(1−max{ρc, ρ}) < 1−max{ρc, ρ} < max{ρc, ρ}
since max{ρc, ρ} > 0.5. Then, it suffices to show that Dλ(Ber(α)||Ber(β)) is (strictly) decreasing in α for 0 ≤
α < β. We have
d
dα
Dλ(Ber(α)||Ber(β)) =
1
λ− 1
λαλ−1β1−λ − λ (1− α)λ−1 (1− β)1−λ
αλβ1−λ + (1− α)λ (1− β)1−λ
. (79)
Since λ ∈ (0, 1), the right-side of (79) is negative iff
αλ−1β1−λ > (1− α)λ−1 (1− β)1−λ , i.e.,
(
1− α
α
)1−λ
>
(
1− β
β
)1−λ
which holds since α < β. 
Finally, we show that the privacy of add-noise ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
∞
t=1 under (32) for every n ≥ 1 with Vt = Vo,
t ≥ 1, is no better than with Vt = V1 or V2 accordingly as 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1 or 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5; and, in fact, the former
can be strictly smaller than the latter.
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Proposition 11. For all n suitably large (depending on case below):
(i) 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5:
piρ (V
n
2 ) ≥ piρ (V
n
o ) ; (80)
(ii) 0.5 < ρ < 1:
k = 2 −
piρ (V
n
1 ) > piρ (V
n
o ) , ρ < ρc (81)
piρ (V
n
1 ) = piρ (V
n
o ) , ρ ≥ ρc; (82)
k ≥ 3 −
piρ (V
n
1 ) > piρ (V
n
o ) . (83)
Proof :
(i) See Appendix D.
(ii) For 0 ≤ ρ < 1, we have by Lemma 9(ii),
piρ (V
n
o )−
(
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
.
= exp [−nC (Vo)] , (84)
and by Theorem 5 for 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1,
piρ (V
n
1 )−
(
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
≥ Λn(ρ), n ≥ 1
.
= exp [− nD(Ber(0.5)||Ber(ρ))], by (48) and Lemma 7(i)
= exp [− nC(V1)], by (73). (85)
For k = 2 and 0.5 < ρ < ρc, by (73) and (74),
C(V1) = − log 2
√
ρ(1− ρ) < − log 2
√
ρc(1− ρc) = C(Vo)
so that (81) holds by (84) and (85). For k = 2 and ρ ≥ ρc, observe in (46) and (18) that V1 = Vo whereby (82)
holds. For k ≥ 3 and 0.5 < ρ < 1, by (73) and (75),
C (V1) = − log 2
√
ρ(1− ρ) ≤ − log 2
√
max{ρc, ρ} (1−max{ρc, ρ}) < C(Vo)
and so (83) holds by (84) and (85).
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VI. DISCUSSION
The choice of Wo : X → Z or Vo : Z → Z in (17), (18), depending on PX through PX (x
∗
i ) , i ∈ Z ,
yields maximal privacy for a single ρ-QR for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. However, for the case of multiple conditionally
independent ρ-QRs, our achievability schemes in Section IV, that are “universal” in the sense of not depending on
PX , perform variously according to the value of ρ. In particular, for 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1, conditionally i.i.d. add-noise ρ-
QRs {Ft(X)}
∞
t=1 with V1 : Z → Z in (46) are asymptotically optimal with privacy piρ (V
n
1 ) converging to the limit
of the upper bounds for ρ-privacy pin(ρ), n ≥ 1, in Theorem 4. However, when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, our add-noise ρ-QRs
with V2 : Z → Z in (59), (60) yield privacy piρ (V
n
2 ) not depending on n, which, in general, does not meet the
corresponding upper bound in (67). Thus, it remains open whether conditionally independent ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
∞
t=1,
that depend on PX or are not necessarily of the add-noise variety, can outperform piρ (V
n
1 ) or piρ (V
n
2 ). Indeed, the
goodness of our upper bound for pin(ρ) in (67), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5 (that does not depend on n), is unresolved. These
observations are analogous – in our setting – to the “composition” results for differential privacy (cf. e.g., [22]).
We conclude with a simple observation in explication of our approach mentioned in Section I. Suppose that the
querier’s family of priors P consists of a specified set of pmfs P on X with PX(x) > 0, x ∈ X . For a single
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ρ-QR, the ρ-privacy pi(ρ) = pi(ρ;P ) for any P in P is attained by Wo = Wo(P ) or Vo = Vo(P ) as remarked after
Theorem 2. With
P∗ = P∗(ρ) = arg min
P∈P
pi(ρ;P ), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
a ρ-QR Wo(P∗) or Vo(P∗) will yield privacy pi(ρ;P∗) in (19) that serves as a guaranteed lower bound for ρ-
privacy computed according to any prior pmf P in P. In the same vein, for n ≥ 1 conditionally independent query
responses, the minima with respect to P in P of the lower bound for piρ (V
n
1 ) in (49) or of piρ (V
n
2 ) in Theorem 6,
respectively, serve as privacy guarantees in the realms 0.5 < ρ ≤ 1 or 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, computed for any P in P.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY IN PROPOSITION 3
We have that 1− pi′ρ (W
′
o) equals
P (g′MAP (W ′o) (Z) = Y ) =
∑
i∈Z
max
j∈Y
P (Z = i, Y = j)
=
∑
i∈Z
max
j∈Y
∑
x∈h−1(j)
PX(x)W
′
o(i|x). (86)
When ρ′c = 1, we get in (86), upon using (29), that
P (g′MAP (W ′o) (Z) = Y ) =
∑
i∈Z
max
j∈Y
∑
x∈h−1(j)∩f−1(i)
PX(x) =
∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j
∗
i ) . (87)
When ρ′c < 1, for each i ∈ Z the summand in (86), upon using (30), is
max
j∈Y

 ∑
x∈h−1(j)∩f−1(i)
PX(x)W
′
o(i|x) +
∑
x∈h−1(j)\f−1(i)
PX(x)W
′
o(i|x)


= max
j∈Y

 ∑
x∈h−1(j)∩f−1(i)
PX(x)

max{ρ′c, ρ}+
(
1−max{ρ′c, ρ}
) PX (i, j∗i )− PX(i, j)∑
l∈Z
PX
(
l, j∗l
)
− PX (h−1(j))


+
∑
x∈h−1(j)\f−1(i)
PX(x)


(
1−max{ρ′c, ρ}
) PX (i, j∗i )− PX(i, j)∑
l∈Z
PX
(
l, j∗l
)
− PX (h−1(j))




= max
j∈Y

max{ρ′c, ρ}PX(i, j) + (1−max{ρ′c, ρ}) PX (i, j∗i )− PX(i, j)∑
l∈Z
PX
(
l, j∗l
)
− PX (h−1(j))
PX
(
h−1(j)
) . (88)
It suffices to show that the right-side of (88) is bounded above by max{ρ′c, ρ}PX (i, j
∗
i ) for each i ∈ Z; this is
done below. Then, in fact, the right-side of (88) equals max{ρ′c, ρ}PX (i, j
∗
i ) as seen by setting j = j
∗
i in the term
within [· · ·].
First consider the case when max{ρ′c, ρ} < 1. It is seen from (27) that for each j ∈ Y ,
max{ρ′c, ρ}
1−max{ρ′c, ρ}
≥
ρ′c
1− ρ′c
=
PX
(
h−1(j∗)
)
∑
l∈Z
PX
(
l, j∗l
)
− PX (h−1(j∗))
≥
PX
(
h−1(j)
)
∑
l∈Z
PX
(
l, j∗l
)
− PX (h−1(j))
. (89)
Using (89) in (88), and since PX
(
h−1(j)
)
> 0, j ∈ Y , we get that the right-side of (88) is bounded above by
max{ρ′c, ρ}PX (i, j
∗
i ). Also, this is true trivially when max{ρ
′
c, ρ} = 1. Hence, we get that for each i ∈ Z , the
right-side of (88) equals max{ρ′c, ρ}PX (i, j
∗
i ). This, combined with (86)-(88), yields
pi′ρ
(
W ′o
)
= 1−max{ρ′c, ρ}
∑
i∈Z
PX (i, j
∗
i ) .
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
(i) For each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)
=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
t=0
P
(
T
Ber( t
n
)
)
where T
Ber( t
n
) denotes the set of all n-length binary sequences of “type” Ber
(
t
n
)
, i.e., with t 1s (and (n− t)
0s), so that
max
0≤t≤⌊n2 ⌋
P
(
T
Ber( t
n
)
)
≤ P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋)
≤
(⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
max
0≤t≤⌊n2 ⌋
P
(
T
Ber( t
n
)
)
. (90)
Using well-known bounds for the probability of all n-length sequences of a given type (cf. [9, Lemma 2.6]),
for each 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, and noting that the number of types for binary sequences of length n equals n+ 1,
1
n+ 1
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
t
n
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ))] ≤ P (TBer( t
n
)
)
≤ exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
t
n
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ))] (91)
and noting that for 0.5 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
min
0≤t≤⌊n2 ⌋
D
(
Ber
(
t
n
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ)) = D(Ber( 1
n
⌊n
2
⌋) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ)) (92)
we have, by (91) and (92), from (90) that
1
n+ 1
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ))] ≤ P (Bin(n, ρ) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋)
≤
(⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
exp
[
−nD
(
Ber
(
1
n
⌊n
2
⌋) ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ber (ρ))] .
(ii) We have that
P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
=
n∑
t=⌊n2 ⌋+1
(
n
t
)
ρt (1− ρ)n−t
= (1− ρ)n
n∑
t=⌊n2 ⌋+1
(
n
t
)(
ρ
1− ρ
)t
≤ (1− ρ)n
(
ρ
1− ρ
)⌊n2 ⌋+1 n∑
t=⌊n2 ⌋+1
(
n
t
)
, since 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5
≤ (1− ρ)n
(
ρ
1− ρ
)⌊n2 ⌋+1
2n−1
≤ (1− ρ)n
(
ρ
1− ρ
)n−1
2
+1
2n−1
= ρ
(
2
√
ρ(1− ρ)
)n−1
≤ ρ, since 2
√
ρ(1− ρ) ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The assertion follows.

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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (33)
Since ρ and maxi∈Z P (f(X) = i) are obvious lower bounds for the left-side of (33), it suffices to show that
P (hMAP (F1(X), . . . , Fn(X)) = f(X)) ≥ P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
. (93)
The proof bears a resemblance to that of Theorem 4 above and so we shall refer to pertinent details therein. We
have
P (hMAP (F1(X), . . . , Fn(X)) = f(X))
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
P (f(X) = j)P (F1(X) = i1, . . . , Fn(X) = in|f(X) = j) . (94)
Since
P (F1(X) = i1, . . . , Fn(X) = in|f(X) = j)
=
∑
x∈X
P (F1(X) = i1, . . . , Fn(X) = in|f(X) = j,X = x)P (X = x|f(X) = j)
=
∑
x∈f−1(j)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x)
PX(x)
P (f(X) = j)
,
we get in (94) with Al(i) in (39) that
P (hMAP (F1(X), . . . , Fn(X)) = f(X)) =
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z

 ∑
x∈f−1(j)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x)


≥
∑
i∈Z
n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Al(i)
max
j∈Z

 ∑
x∈f−1(j)
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x)


≥
∑
i∈Z
∑
x∈f−1(i)
PX(x)

 n∑
l=⌊n2 ⌋+1
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Al(i)
n∏
t=1
Wt (it|x)

 .
Mimicking (40)-(43), observe that the sum above within (·) is bounded below by P
(
Bin(n, ρ) ≥
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
. Clearly,
(93) follows. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11(i)
The following two lemmas are pertinent. Recall from (15) that x∗ = arg maxx∈X PX (x) is in f
−1 (i∗) for some
(fixed) i∗ ∈ Z .
Lemma D.1. For Vo : Z → Z in (18),
(i) when ρc < ρ ≤ 1, no two rows can be identical;
(ii) when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc, if the rows Vo(·|j) and Vo(·|j
′), j 6= j′, are identical, then each coincides with the row
Vo(·|i
∗), in which case PX(x
∗
j ) = PX(x
∗
j′) = PX (x
∗). Furthermore, the number of identical rows of Vo
cannot exceed
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
.
Proof : With 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, if the rows of Vo : Z → Z corresponding to j 6= j
′ in Z are identical, then
V (i|j) = V (i|j′), i ∈ Z \ {j, j′}
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i.e.,
(1−max{ρc, ρ})
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l 6=j
PX
(
x∗l
) = (1−max{ρc, ρ}) PX (x∗i )∑
l′ 6=j′
PX
(
x∗l′
) , i ∈ Z \ {j, j′}
whence
PX
(
x∗j
)
= PX
(
x∗j′
)
; (95)
and furthermore
V (i|j) = V (i|j′), i ∈ {j, j′}
which, using (95), gives straightforwardly that
max{ρc, ρ} =
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
) , i ∈ {j, j′}. (96)
(i) When ρ > ρc, recalling (16)
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
) ≤ PX (x∗)∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
) = ρc < max{ρc, ρ}
which violates (96) for i ∈ {j, j′}, so that no two rows of Vo : Z → Z can be identical.
(ii) When 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc, suppose that the rows Vo(·|j) and Vo(·|j
′) are identical for some j 6= j′. Then (96) holds
which, upon recalling (16), is tantamount to
PX(x
∗
j) = PX(x
∗
j′) = PX(x
∗) = PX(x
∗
i∗). (97)
To show for j 6= i∗ that Vo(i|j) = Vo(i|i
∗), i ∈ Z , consider first i ∈ {j, i∗}. Then, using (97),
Vo(j|j) = ρc, Vo(i
∗|j) = (1− ρc)
PX (x
∗
i∗)∑
l 6=j
PX
(
x∗l
) = (1− ρc) PX (x∗)∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
)
− PX(x∗j)
= ρc,
and similarly,
Vo(j|i
∗) = (1− ρc)
PX(x
∗
j )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
)
− PX (x∗i∗)
= ρc, Vo(i
∗|i∗) = ρc.
And for i ∈ Z \ {j, i∗},
Vo(i|j) = (1− ρc)
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
)
− PX(x∗j)
=
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l∈Z
PX
(
x∗l
) = Vo(i|i∗).
Lastly, if the number of identical rows of Vo : Z → Z is α, then αPX (x
∗) ≤
∑
l∈Z
PX (x
∗
l ), whence α ≤
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
.

For S ⊆ Z, let
jS = arg max
l∈S
PX (x
∗
l ) , RS = (Z \ S) ∪ {jS}, (98)
where jS and RS need not be unique. Let f˜RS(X) be a RS-valued rv with pmf
P
(
f˜RS(X) = i
)
=
PX (x
∗
i )∑
l∈RS
PX
(
x∗l
) , i ∈ RS . (99)
Consider the stochastic matrix VRS : RS → Z given by
VRS = {V (i|j), i ∈ Z, j ∈ RS} (100)
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and let
{
Z˜RSt
}n
t=1
be conditionally mutually independent Z-valued rvs conditioned on f˜RS(X), with
P
Z˜
RS
t |f˜RS (X)
= VRS , t = 1, . . . , n. (101)
Let C (VRS) be the Chernoff radius restricted to RS , i.e., with the minimum in (68) being instead over all j 6= j
′
in RS .
Lemma D.2. For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, consider add-noise ρ-QRs {Ft(X)}
n
t=1 with (32) holding for every n ≥ 1, where
Vt = V, t ≥ 1. If V : Z → Z has identical rows {V (·|j), j ∈ S}, then
piρ (V
n)−
(
1−
∑
i∈RS
PX (x
∗
i )
)
.
= exp [−nC (VRS)]
for RS and VRS in (98) and (100), respectively.
Remark: If the rows of VRS : RS → Z are distinct in Lemma D.2, then C (VRS) > 0. If the rows of V : Z → Z
are distinct, then S = φ, RS = Z and VRS = V .
Proof :
P
(
gMAP(V n) (Z1, . . . , Zn) = X
)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈X
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V (it|f(x))
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
x∈∪f−1(j)
j∈Z
PX(x)
n∏
t=1
V (it|f(x))
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈Z
PX
(
x∗j
) n∏
t=1
V (it|j)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈(Z\S)∪S
PX
(
x∗j
) n∏
t=1
V (it|j)
=
∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈RS
PX(x
∗
j )
n∏
t=1
V (it|j) (102)
=
(∑
i∈RS
PX (x
∗
i )
) ∑
(i1,...,in)∈Zn
max
j∈RS
PX(x
∗
j )∑
i∈RS
PX (x∗i )
n∏
t=1
V (it|j)
=
(∑
i∈RS
PX (x
∗
i )
)
P
(
g
MAP
(
V nRS
) (Z˜RS1 , . . . , Z˜RSn ) = f˜RS(X)
)
(103)
where (102) is by the identicality of the rows {V (·|j) , j ∈ S}, and f˜RS(X) and {Z˜
RS
t }
n
t=1 are as in (99) and (101),
respectively. The assertion follows by applying [23, Theorem 2] to (103). 
Turning to the proof of Proposition 11(i), first observe by Theorem 6 that for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5 and every n ≥ 1,
piρ (V
n
2 )−
(
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
≥
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )−max


PX(x
∗),
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρ⌋
⌋
−1
(
k mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
=0
)
∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρ
⌋
)


> 0. (104)
We consider two cases: ρ > ρc and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc.
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When ρ > ρc, by Lemma D.1(i), all the rows of Vo : Z → Z are distinct so that C(Vo) > 0. Then, by (84),
lim
n
piρ (V
n
o )−
(
1−
∑
i∈Z
PX (x
∗
i )
)
= 0
which upon comparison with (104), yields (80) in this case.
In the case 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc, Vo : Z → Z can contain identical rows. By Lemma D.1(ii) and upon invoking
assumption (45) without loss of generality, the identical rows must be those corresponding to {0, 1, . . . , a−1} (with
the remaining rows being all distinct), where a ≤
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
is the number of identical rows. By applying Lemma D.2,
with S = {0, 1, . . . , a− 1}, jS = 0 and observing that C
(
(Vo)RS
)
> 0, we get
lim
n
piρ (V
n
o ) = 1−
∑
i∈RS
PX (x
∗
i )
=


1− PX (x
∗) , a = k ⇔
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
= k
1−
∑
i∈{0,a,a+1,...,k−1}
PX (x
∗
i ) , a < k ⇔
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
< k
≤


1− PX (x
∗) ,
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
= k
1−
∑
i∈
{
0,
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
,
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
+1,...,k−1
}PX (x∗i ) ,
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
< k
≤


1− PX (x
∗) , ρc =
1
k
1−
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρc ⌋
⌋
∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
)
, k mod
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
6= 0, 1
k
< ρc ≤ 0.5
1−
⌊
k
⌊ 1ρc ⌋
⌋
−1∑
i=0
PX
(
x∗
i
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
)
, k mod
⌊
1
ρc
⌋
= 0, 1
k
< ρc ≤ 0.5
= piρc (V
n
2 )
≤ piρ (V
n
2 ) , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρc,
which, upon recalling by Theorem 6 that piρ (V
n
2 ) is the same for all n, establishes (80). 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are indebted to: Himanshu Tyagi and Shun Watanabe for educating us in private function computation,
helping formulate the models in this paper, and for numerous beneficial discussions that informed our approach;
Adam Smith for raising the question of predicate privacy [33]; and all three anonymous reviewers for examining
our work under a microscope and suggesting several improvements.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, “Privacy-preserving data mining,” in Proceeding of the ACM SIGMOD International Conference on
Management of Data, pp. 439-450, May 2000.
[2] S. Asoodeh, M. Diaz, F. Alajaji and T. Linder, “Estimation efficiency under privacy constraints,” arXiv:1707.02409 [cs.IT], 2018.
[3] R. Bassily, A. Groce, J. Katz and A. Smith, “Coupled-world privacy: Exploiting adversarial uncertainty in statistical data privacy,”
Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 439-448, Oct. 2013.
[4] R. Bassily and A. Smith, “Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct histograms,” in Proceedings of the 47th ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, pp. 127-135, June 2015.
[5] A. Blum, C. Dwork, F. McSherry and K. Nissim, “Practical privacy: The SuLQ framework,” in Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGMOD-
SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, pp 128-138, June 2005.
[6] A. Blum, K. Ligett and A. Roth, “A learning theory approach to non-interactive database privacy,” in Proceedings of the 40th ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp 609-618, May 2008.
[7] F. du Pin Calmon and N. Fawaz, “Privacy against statistical inference,” in Proceedings of the 50th Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control and Computing, pp. 1401-1408, Oct. 2012.
30
[8] H. Chernoff, “A measure of asymptotic efficiency for tests of a hypothesis based on the sum of observations,” Ann. Math. Statist., vol.
23, pp. 493-507, 1952.
[9] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Channels, 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2011.
[10] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan and M. J. Wainwright, “Minimax optimal procedures for locally private estimation,” 2016, arXiv:1604.02390
[math.ST], 2016.
[11] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, pp 1-12, Springer, July 2006.
[12] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis,” Theory of Cryptography
Conference, pp. 265-284, Springer, 2006.
[13] T. van Erven and P. Harremo¨es, “Re´nyi divergence and Kullback-Leibler divergence,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 7, pp.
3797-3820, July 2014.
[14] A. Evfimievski, R. Agrawal, R. Srikant and J. Gehrke, “Privacy preserving mining of association rules,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 217-228, July 2002.
[15] A. Evfimievski, J. Gehrke and R. Srikant, “Limiting privacy breaches in privacy preserving data mining,” in Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, pp. 211-222, June 2003.
[16] Q. Geng and P. Viswanath, “The optimal noise-adding mechanism in differential privacy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 2, pp.
925-951, Feb. 2016.
[17] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville and Y. Bengio, “Generative adversarial
nets.,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 2672 − 2680, 2014.
[18] M. Hardt and K. Talwar, “On the geometry of differential privacy,” in Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pp. 705-714, June 2010.
[19] C. Huang, P. Kairouz, X. Chen, L. Sankar and R. Rajagopal, “Context-aware generative adversarial privacy,” Entropy, vol. 19, no. 12,
Dec. 2017.
[20] I. Issa, S. Kamath and A. B. Wagner, “An operational measure of information leakage,” in Annual Conf. on Information Science and
Systems, pp. 520-524, July 2016.
[21] P. Kairouz, K. Bonawitz and D. Ramage, “Discrete distribution estimation under local privacy,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Int. Conf.
on Machine Learning, vol. 48, pp. 2436-2444, June 2016.
[22] P. Kairouz, S. Oh and P. Viswanath, “The composition theorem for differential privacy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 63, no. 6, pp.
4037-4049, June 2017.
[23] F. Kanaya and T. S. Han, “The asymptotics of posterior entropy and error probability for bayesian estimation,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1988-1992, Nov. 1995.
[24] S. P. Kasivisiwanathan and A. Smith, “On the semantics of differential privacy: A Bayesian formulation,” Journal of Privacy and
Confidentiality, vol. 6, no. 1, Aug. 2014.
[25] N. Li, T. Li and S. Venkatasubramanian, “t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity,” IEEE 23rd International Conference
on Data Engineering, pp. 106-115, April 2007.
[26] J. Liao, O. Kosut, L. Sankar and F. P. Calmon, “Privacy under hard distortion constraints,” arXiv:1806.00063 [cs.IT], 2018.
[27] A. Makhdoumi and N. Fawaz, “Privacy-utility tradeoff under statistical uncertainty,” in Proceedings of the 50th Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control and Computing, pp. 1627-1634, Oct 2013.
[28] F. McSherry and K. Talwar, “Mechanism design via differential privacy,” in Proceedings of the 48th Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, pp. 94-103, Oct. 2007.
[29] D. Rebollo-Monedero, J. Forne´ and J. Domingo-Ferrer, “From t-closeness-like privacy to postrandomization via information theory,”
IEEE Trans. on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 1623-1636, Nov. 2010.
[30] A. Re´nyi, “On measures of entropy and information,” in Proceedings of the 4th Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and
Probability, vol. 1, pp. 547-561, 1961.
[31] L. Sankar, S. R. Rajagopalan and H. V. Poor, “Utility-privacy tradeoff in databases: An information-theoretic approach,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 6, June 2013.
[32] A. Smith, “Privacy-preserving statistical estimation with optimal convergence rates,” in Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, pp. 813-822, June 2011.
[33] A. Smith, Personal communication, March 2018.
[34] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based
Systems, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 557-570, Oct. 2002.
[35] L. Wasserman and S. Zhou, “A statistical framework for differential privacy,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 105,
pp. 375-389, 2010.
[36] M. Ye and A. Barg, “Optimal schemes for discrete distribution estimation under locally differential privacy,” arXiv:1702.00610 [cs.LG],
2017.
